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Abstract
This paper reviews issues in the econometric modelling of monetary policy in the
light of recent experience and research. Two main sets of issues are covered: first,
the operation of policy including the specification of the instrument and objectives;
and second, the transmission of monetary policy effects to the wider economy.
There is also a discussion of the inherent limitations on the ability to quantify the
role of monetary policy in econometric models.
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1. Introduction
Macroeconomic models embody two important sets of hypotheses about the role of
monetary policy. The first concerns the operation of policy, or how the policy
instrument reacts to wider economic developments. This aspect of model design
involves assumptions about the choice of instrument, the form of decision-rules
relating instruments to objectives and the operational meaning of a ‘no policy
change’ assumption with respect to monetary policy. Secondly, models embody a
range of hypotheses about how changes in policy-related variables influence the
economy as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of issues
related to these two aspects of policy modelling, drawing on recent macroeconomic
developments and on research conducted mainly at the RBA.
In Section 2 we discuss the monetary policy framework in Australia, and how it
might relate to the policy assumptions built into macroeconomic models. In
particular we discuss the role of money supplies and interest rates as policy
variables, and advocate model specifications that fully recognise the short-term
interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. This leads to a suggested emphasis
on studying policy rules that differ in important ways from standard money-growth
rules. Section 3 then gives a review of evidence, mainly from RBA sources, on the
monetary transmission process, in order to draw some general conclusions about
how monetary policy affects the economy and how this might be reflected in
modelling strategies. The themes are drawn together in Section 4 with some general
observations concerning pitfalls and limitations of model-based policy analysis.
                                                                                                                                  
1 This paper was originally prepared for a conference of the Economic Modelling Bureau of
Australia, held on 23 May 1996. The aim was to provide an introduction and background for a
discussion of econometric model results, drawing on available Reserve Bank research.2
2. Modelling the Policy Framework
Essentials of the policy framework that need to be understood for the purposes of
model-building can be briefly outlined in terms of instruments, objectives and
decision criteria.
The instrument of monetary policy is the short-term interest rate – really, the
overnight cash rate although, for the purposes of a quarterly or annual econometric
model, this might be regarded as largely interchangeable with the 90-day bill rate.
Since January 1990, changes to the desired cash rate have been publicly announced,
a system that has been conducive to keeping cash rates in a tight range around the
desired level (Figure 1). Cash-rate announcements have been accompanied on each
occasion by public statements setting out the reasons for the change.
The objectives of monetary policy in terms of inflation and output performance have
been described in detail in a number of public statements and publications by the
Bank over recent years2, and were formally set out in the recent Statement on the
Conduct of Monetary Policy3. That statement notes that the policy objectives
defined in the  Reserve Bank Act ‘allow the Reserve Bank to focus on price
(currency) stability while taking account of the implications of monetary policy for
activity and, therefore, employment in the short term’. The Statement also sets out
the Bank’s inflation objective in numerical terms:
‘In pursuing the goal of medium term price stability the Reserve Bank has adopted
the objective of keeping underlying inflation between 2 and 3 per cent, on average,
over the cycle. This formulation allows for the natural short run variation in
underlying inflation over the cycle while preserving a clearly identifiable
benchmark performance over time.’
A number of points can be emphasised concerning the implications of this
formulation. These concern both the inflation objective itself, and the relationship
between objectives for inflation and output. With regard to the inflation objective, it
should be noted that the specified 2-3 per cent range does not represent a
hard-edged target band within which the inflation rate is to be confined in every
                                                                                                                                  
2 See in particular Fraser (1994), Debelle and Stevens (1995), Grenville (1996).
3 Full details are set out in ‘Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy’ (1996).3
period. The range has instead been described as a ‘thick point’, an indicator of
central tendency rather than a target band, and the use of a range rather than a point
is intended to recognise the imprecision with which inflation can be controlled and
to avoid the spurious accuracy of point targets. Also important is that the objective
is to be achieved on average over time rather than in every period, so it is a
medium-term rather than fixed-period objective, where ‘medium-term’ is broadly
defined as the length of a business cycle. The inflation objective is specified in
underlying terms, using a measure of prices (the Treasury’s underlying rate) which
abstracts from the effects on the CPI of erratic factors such as government charges
and interest-rate movements. These features of the inflation objective leave room for
flexibility for policy to take into account short-run developments in output and
employment and to consider both the real economy and inflationary short-run
consequences of shocks when formulating policy responses. This sort of flexibility
is in fact built in, in varying degrees, to the systems of other inflation-targeting
countries. Over longer periods when monetary policy cannot be expected to have
lasting effects on output and employment, the policy objective anchors inflation in
the 2-3 per cent range.4
Given the instrument and objective of policy, it remains to comment on the decision
criteria linking policy decisions to information about the objective variables. Here
two points can be made. First, because of information and impact lags, the objective
requires monetary policy to be explicitly forward-looking: thus the policy instrument
will be adjusted in response to expectations of price and output variables in a way
consistent with keeping inflation on the desired medium-term path. This will in
practice mean looking at a range of variables that provide useful forward
information about price and output trends. This is not a ‘look at everything’ rule but
a criterion for interpreting information from a potentially large number of sources.
Second, there is no formal commitment to a policy role for any particular
intermediate variables such as monetary or financial aggregates. These and other
variables are evaluated pragmatically for their usefulness as forward indicators and
are in no sense to be regarded as ‘intermediate objectives’. In practice the monetary
aggregates in Australia have been highly unstable in their behaviour over at least the
                                                                                                                                  
4 It should be noted in passing that there is nothing illogical about having both prices and output
in the objective function. This kind of formulation is a standard feature of literature on the
theory of monetary policy, as for example in the textbook treatment of Blanchard and Fischer
(1989).4
past decade or so and their information content is regarded as small.5 An implication
of this discussion is that there is no obvious definition of an ‘unchanged policy’
stance in terms of a constant interest rate or money-supply growth rate. In a
modelling context, ‘unchanged policy’ needs to be defined in terms of a given
decision rule relating the short-term interest rate to information about prices and
output in a way consistent with achievement of the medium-term objective.
In qualitative terms the conceptual framework outlined above is broadly consistent
with those operating in a variety of countries, including those with formally
legislated inflation targets and others with somewhat broader objectives. In a recent
survey Haldane (1995) argues that the basic features of this framework – ie the use
of an interest rate instrument to directly target final objectives for output and
inflation over a period of time – are applicable to a wide range of countries, with
cross-country differences arising mainly on more secondary matters such as time
frames, tolerance bands and the like. This role for interest rates is also increasingly
recognised in the academic literature, as for example in studies by Bernanke and
Blinder (1990), Taylor (1993) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995) which empirically
represent US monetary policy decisions by changes in the federal funds rate. Blinder
(1996) provides a neat summary of this view which is worth quoting in detail:
Today, the real short-term interest rate is the logical replacement for the money
growth rate. Its ‘neutral’ value can be estimated from history and/or from
econometric models, although it can never be known with certainty. ‘Tight’
monetary policy can then be defined as keeping the real interest rate higher than
neutral. Such a policy can be expected to contract the economy, after a lag, and
reduce inflation, after an even longer lag.
There has been much talk in recent years of the problem posed by the loss of the
so-called nominal anchor for monetary policy when monetary aggregates are
bandoned in favour of interest rates. The new ‘anchor’ I am tacitly proposing has
three pieces:
1. the central bank’s long-run inflation target;
2. its commitment to keep real interest rates higher than neutral when inflation is
above target, other things equal;
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3. understanding that nominal interest rates must not be held fixed, but must be
adjusted for inflation because it is real interest rates that matter.
Despite these trends, one gets the impression that it is still not quite academically
respectable to replace money supplies with interest rates in formal models.6 This
appears to stem from theoretical results such as reported by Sargent (1979) to the
effect that exogenous interest-rate-setting policies are unstable or leave prices
indeterminate.7 It should be noted, however, that these results apply only under the
extreme assumption that interest-rate setting is unrelated to nominal policy
objectives. McCallum (1986) and others have shown that well-specified rate-setting
policies are fully capable of providing a suitable nominal anchor, provided the
rate-setting rule is specified as a function that includes a nominal target variable, a
requirement that would clearly be met by inflation targeting systems or by a range of
other possible systems such as nominal income targets.
Full recognition of the role of interest rates as the policy instrument in a modelling
context cannot be achieved simply by inverting money-demand functions to produce
what might be interpreted as rate-setting policy rules. This procedure does not really
get around the problem of identifying a given policy setting with an exogenous
money-growth path. To illustrate, suppose a simplified money-demand function of
the following form (ignoring dynamics):
m p y r - = - a b (1)
where variables have the obvious definitions and are measured relative to
steady-state values. This can be inverted to give an expression for the interest rate







                                                                                                                                  
6 For example, Mishkin’s (1995) summary of a recent symposium on the monetary transmission
mechanism repeatedly defines a monetary policy shock as ‘Mﬂ’.
7 In the simplest case, that of a fixed nominal interest rate, inflationary shocks reduce the real
interest rate and are therefore self-reinforcing.6
For the purposes of policy simulation it is possible to think of an exogenous
money-growth path in this equation as being akin to a kind of target index for an
appropriately weighted average of prices and output, so the approach can be argued
to have some validity for policy analysis irrespective of the poor historical
performance of monetary aggregates as policy indicators. On this interpretation the
interest-rate equation would just represent a reaction function to deviations of the
price and output index from target. Since this is broadly what has been advocated in
the preceding discussion, it might be thought that this kind of policy assumption
would yield reasonable results. Our point however is that the parameters and
dynamics of the inverted money-demand function do not necessarily have anything
to do with those of a sensible policy-reaction function, except to the extent that it is
legitimate to think of the monetary authority as adhering to a strict money target.8
An alternative way of making this point would be to add to the above equations a
money-supply function that smooths the interest rate, say:
m ar bp cy = + + (3)
This can in principle be combined with equation (1) to eliminate money and arrive at
a policy reaction function whose parameters would differ from those of equation (2).
If we wish to analyse policy behaviour under reasonable assumptions about the
policy framework, there is thus no reason to think it would look like a variant of
equation (2) with exogenous money.
In our view a more promising approach is found in recent studies by Bryant, Mann
and Hooper (1993) and by Taylor (1993, 1995), which bypass the money-demand
function altogether and specify interest-rate policies as simple functions of price and
output variables with simple dynamics. This approach has a number of advantages
in that it puts the focus on comparative stabilising properties of alternative rules,
within a class of rules that has appealing properties, rather than on the dynamics of
responses to shocks under any one particular rule.9 Taylor (1993) obtains the useful
result that interest-rate setting in the US since the mid 1980s is well approximated
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with freely-chosen parameters dominates money targeting in terms of stabilisation of prices and
output.
9 Edey (1989, 1990) gives a discussion of theoretical principles that might guide the design of
simple rate-setting policy rules with desirable stabilisation properties.7
by simple functions of price and output movements, and his empirical model
suggests that this class of policy rules is capable of approximating the stabilisation
properties of an optimal rule.
3. The Monetary Policy Transmission Process
Our second broad task in this paper is to review empirical evidence on the monetary
policy transmission process. As noted at the outset, this review draws mainly on
research originating at the Reserve Bank. The topic can usefully be divided into
three parts: the influence of cash rates on other financial prices; the role of money
and credit; and the effect of financial variables on activity and inflation.
3.1 The Influence of Cash Rates on other Financial Prices
Changes in the cash rate can be expected to influence the entire structure of interest
rates and yields on financial assets. A useful starting point is to consider the effect
of cash rates on other interest rates relevant to private-sector decisions. Lowe
(1995) examined the extent and speed of ‘pass-through’ from cash rates to sixteen
interest rates of securities markets and financial institutions. In general, the
pass-through to short-term money-market interest rates is rapid and complete, while
most deposit and lending rates are much less responsive, particularly for
low-balance deposit accounts, housing and consumer loans. The business indicator
rate is the most responsive lending rate, but pass-through is nonetheless found to be
incomplete. Since intermediaries’ interest rates are likely to be the most important
ones for private-sector decisions, this general pattern of slow pass-through would
help to account for part of the overall transmission lag from cash rates to the
economy.
The relationship with longer-term interest rates can be thought of as reflecting two
effects: a ‘liquidity effect’, essentially representing the impact of cash-rate changes
on near-term expectations of future cash rates; and an effect on longer-term inflation
expectations. The expectations hypothesis of the term structure suggests an overall
impact representing the expected net effect of these factors on future short rates
averaged over the life of the security. Broadly consistent with this, results of simple
level-regressions by Lowe indicate positive pass-through from cash rates to various
longer-term securities rates, but that the size of the coefficients declines the longer is8
the maturity of the bond. Results from regressions using changes in interest rates are
less clear, particularly for longer term bonds, with significant cash-rate effects only
found on security yields out to a maturity of two years.
Formal tests of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, by
Macfarlane (1988) and by Whitelaw, de Roos and Groeger (1995), suggest that the
hypothesis can be rejected with Australian data, though the rejections are not
dramatic. These studies find some evidence of predictable excess returns in bond
markets related both to prior movements in foreign bond yields and to domestic
short-term rates. The first of these results might be consistent with models of
financial risk premia, while the second can be interpreted as evidence of an ‘excess’
sensitivity of long-term interest rates to current short-term rates. Regarding
international linkages, there is clear evidence of significant cross-country
co-movements in levels of bond yields (Fahrer and Shori 1990; Orr, Edey and
Kennedy, 1995) arguably due to a combination of correlated shifts in inflation
expectations and common factors influencing real interest rates internationally. The
highly internationally-correlated rise in bond yields during 1994 provides a powerful
illustration of these linkages, but research by Gruen (1995) and by Orr  et al.
suggests that it is hard to find a fully convincing explanation for these movements in
terms of observable fundamentals.
The study by Orr et al. uses a panel regression to estimate a model of long-term
interest rate determination in 17 OECD countries. The authors distinguish between
slow-moving or ‘fundamental’ explanatory factors and dynamics largely driven by
interactions among interest rates in different countries. It is the latter that largely
account for the 1994 episode while the fundamental factors (principally fiscal and
current account positions and a measure of policy credibility) explain longer-term
trends and cross-country differentials. An important result is the significance of a
policy-credibility variable based on countries’ past inflation record, which includes
lags of inflation of up to 10 years. The implication is that credibility takes a long
time to establish, and the detrimental effects of a poor track record of
inflation-control take a long time to drop out of market expectations of inflation.
This is a result that is at odds with strong presumptions of forward-looking
behaviour made by theorists, but one that rings true with policymakers.
Taken together the sources cited point to strong and fairly consistent effects of cash
rate changes on security-market rates out to around two years maturity, which might9
be thought of as the period over which markets can form reasonably well-based
expectations of policy responses to foreseeable developments. Results on the
determinants of long-term bond yields do not really provide a coherent picture but
suggest that these are best characterised as reflecting a combination of forward and
backward looking factors along with significant international influences. The
backward-looking elements should not be underplayed, and in particular it seems
that the lags in the effect of past inflation on nominal bond yields can be quite long.
Effects of cash rates on key borrowing and lending rates are also subject to variable
lags attributable to interest-rate smoothing by financial institutions, but there is some
evidence of these lags shortening as markets become more competitive and
contestable.
The influence of interest rates on the exchange rate represents an important
component of the transmission process, but one where empirical analysis has not
been very successful in linking theory to actual behaviour. A standard assumption in
macroeconomic theory is that of uncovered interest parity, which relates expected
exchange rate movements to interest differentials. This assumption allows a neat
conceptual framework for exchange-rate determination whereby the steady-state
exchange rate is thought of as being tied down by variables determining the long-run
equilibrium, and the path of adjustment to that equilibrium is determined by the
expected path of future interest differentials. Unfortunately, however, empirical
evidence consistently rejects the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and
uncovered interest parity, often finding that interest differentials have insignificant
or wrong-signed coefficients as predictors of exchange rate movements.10 A recent
example for Australia is a study by Gruen and Kortian (1996) which finds that
predictable terms-of-trade movements generate predictable excess returns with
respect to the $A exchange rate.
Notwithstanding these results it would seem undeniable that exchange-rate
determination is strongly forward-looking and influenced by monetary policy
settings, raising the question of whether or not the uncovered interest parity
assumption might nonetheless be a useful approximation for the purposes of
model-building. It is hard to give a categorical answer to this, since there is a lack of
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obvious alternatives despite the poor empirical performance of the hypothesis.
Gruen and Wilkinson (1994) estimate a model of Australia’s real exchange rate over
the post-float period which they find to have good fit both within and out of sample,
using the terms of trade and real interest differentials as explanatory variables.11
They report that long-term interest rates dominate short-term rates in the equation.
Despite the good statistical properties reported, the implications of their results for a
structural model are not clear, since the estimated equation is essentially a reduced
form relationship among endogenous variables. In particular, interest rates and
exchange rates are likely to be closely inter-related contemporaneously, making
cause and effect relationships between them difficult to disentangle. For the
purposes of policy analysis it makes sense to think of the exchange rate as being
influenced by short-term interest rates, even though such effects may well be
difficult to estimate empirically given the severe problem of simultaneous causation.
As noted by Friedman (1995), this is part of a general problem of identifying the
effects of monetary policy actions where those actions are largely systematic
responses to movements in other macroeconomic variables that they also affect.
3.2 The Role of Money and Credit
A formal policy role for monetary aggregates (in the form of a ‘conditional
projection’ for M3) was abandoned in Australia in 1985. This reflected an
assessment that the aggregates were too unstable in their relation to final objectives
to serve as a policy anchor. As noted above in Section 2, this does not necessarily
preclude a role for money and credit as indicator variables, but their information
content with respect to final policy objectives needs to be continually re-assessed.
The most comprehensive recent study on this topic was by de Brouwer et al. (1993)
who tested the stability of a variety of money-demand functions and assessed the
sensitivity of these relationships to alternative definitions of the key variables and to
different testing procedures. Evidence of cointegration between money, income and
interest rates was not particularly strong, and the results were sensitive to changes in
the definition of activity and interest rates and to the testing procedure used. No
evidence was found of cointegration between M1 and income, and only scant
evidence for the money base. Of 192 feasible combinations of the real money base,
                                                                                                                                  
11 Other work by Blundell-Wignall, Fahrer and Heath (1993) and Tarditi (1995) built on these
results.11
real activity, nominal interest rates, and estimation techniques that were considered,
evidence supported cointegration in only 11 cases. Results were similarly negative
in the cases of M3 (4 out of 60 combinations) and Broad Money (5 out of 30). The
strongest evidence was found for currency (8 out of 24 combinations) but this
relationship has since deteriorated, with the ratio of currency to income shifting
markedly beyond the sample period used for the formal tests. These results confirm
the impression of instability apparent from eyeballing the data in Figure 2. Since
cointegration is a minimal requirement for a stable money demand function, the
results are not supportive of a stable role for money aggregates in the transmission
process.
Alternative methods applied in earlier studies gave qualitatively similar results. A
study by Bullock, Morris and Stevens (1989) using graphical evidence and
correlation analysis emphasised the leading and coincident negative relationship
between short-term interest rates and private demand, and found relationships
involving the monetary aggregates to be generally unstable. VAR analysis by
Stevens and Thorp (1989) looking at relationships between financial and activity
variables found the role of money aggregates to be weak and highly sensitive to
model specification and to the sample period.
An issue that has received increasing attention in international literature recently is
the possible role of a ‘credit channel’ in monetary transmission.12 Theories of the
credit transmission channel focus on market imperfections such as information and
monitoring costs which limit borrowers’ access to credit. These imply that access to
credit for financing investment is likely to be affected not only by the risk-adjusted
profitability of a given project, but also by factors such as the borrower’s available
collateral, cash flow, reputation, and other indicators of credit-worthiness, with
credit rationed in equilibrium on the basis of a range of such criteria. This has two
important implications. First, changes in interest rates and in business cycle
conditions could be expected to have distributional and efficiency consequences
related to systematic variation in borrowers’ access to credit. A rise in interest rates
will tend to reduce investment in projects that are least profitable, other things being
equal, but the effect will be strongest in sectors where credit-enhancing factors such
as collateral are scarce. Second, because the severity of credit rationing is likely to
be an increasing function of the general level of interest rates, the credit channel
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represents a potential amplifying factor in the transmission of monetary policy. It is
also likely to interact with macroeconomic developments, such as asset-price swings
and trends in balance-sheet strength, which influence assessments of borrowers’
credit-worthiness.
Tests of these propositions reported in the international literature do not focus
strongly on the role of credit aggregates in macroeconomic outcomes; proponents of
the ‘credit view’ argue that the role of these aggregates is not central to the story,
since the stock of intermediaries’ credit outstanding does not really measure
variations in the impact of credit rationing. Rather, the emphasis in empirical work
has been on examination of factors affecting the availability of credit at the firm or
industry level. Results summarised by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for the US are
supportive of a role for credit-availability factors in explaining borrowing and
investment at this level, and are thus consistent with the operation of a credit
channel in monetary transmission.
Recent Australian studies are also supportive of such a channel. At an aggregate
level, Lowe and Rohling (1993) find significant effects from various measures of
balance-sheet strength on the availability of finance to business and, in particular,
that rises in asset prices and in corporate equity tend to make finance easier to
obtain. Panel data studies by Shuetrim, Lowe and Morling (1993) and Mills,
Morling and Tease (1994) give a more detailed picture of the role of credit-factors
in business behaviour at the firm level. They find that, in addition to macroeconomic
influences, firms’ borrowings and investment are influenced by a number of
plausible indicators of credit availability. Most important among those are firm size,
growth, collateral and cash flow. The influence of these factors on investment
behaviour is found to be particularly strong for small firms. All these channels are
probably difficult to capture in macroeconomic models, but a key lesson seems to be
that interest rate changes interact with other macroeconomic factors in a way that
potentially reinforces their impact on investment. The recent asset-price cycle is a
leading example.
3.3 Effects of Financial Variables on Activity and Inflation
A recent review by Grenville (1996) identifies five main channels by which
monetary policy affects activity and inflation:13
• ‘intertemporal substitution’, broadly defined as the effect of interest rates on
the incentive to postpone expenditure;
• effects operating through the exchange rate on the tradeable sector;
• cash-flow effects on liquidity-constrained borrowers;
• a wealth channel operating via the effect of interest rates on asset prices; and
• credit supply effects.
Further to these could be added an expectations channel, referring to the direct
influence of policy decisions on expectations of inflation and growth. The discussion
that follows cites evidence concerning the overall magnitude and timing of monetary
transmission.13
Two recent studies give estimates of the overall impact of interest rates on activity.
Gruen and Shuetrim (1994) estimated a model of the Australian business cycle
which specified real growth as a function of a weather indicator, the terms of trade,
foreign output and real cash rates, finding a significant impact of real cash rates on
GDP with lags of 6 to 18 months. The estimates imply the peak effect of a
temporary 1 percentage point decrease in real cash rates (sustained for one year)
raises four-quarter-ended GDP growth by about 0.4 per cent, and the level of GDP
by about 0.65 per cent. Unpublished analysis by the authors suggests that similar
results are obtained using alternative interest-rate maturities but that the two-year
bond rate gives perhaps the best explanatory power. No independent role is found
for the exchange rate in this aggregate equation, although effects of the exchange
rate on the tradeable sector are well documented elsewhere.
Broadly similar results concerning the impact and timing of interest-rate effects on
activity were obtained by Lowe (1992) in a study of the predictive power of the
yield curve. Consistent with international evidence it was found that the slope of the
yield curve (proxied in this study by the difference between yields on 10 year
Treasury bonds and 180 day bank bills) has predictive power for a wide range of
real variables including GDP, consumption, investment, a production index,
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dwelling approvals and car registrations. Predictive power for most variables is
significant in the range of 9 to 18 months ahead, with somewhat shorter lags evident
in the case of dwelling approvals. At its peak, a 1 percentage point increase in the
yield spread predicts increased GDP growth by 0.6 percentage points. If it is
presumed that policy influences the slope of the yield curve mainly by moving the
short end, these results suggest effects of similar magnitude to the Gruen-Shuetrim
equation. Investment and dwellings are found to be the most interest-sensitive
sectors, although significant predictive power for consumption is also obtained.
Lowe also tested for information in the yield curve about future inflation. Significant
predictive power was found although the estimated lags were perhaps implausibly
long, the strongest effects occurring at around 24 to 36 months out.
Econometric studies of the inflation process by Stevens (1992), Cockerell and
Russell (1995) and de Brouwer and Ericsson (1995) have adopted the general
approach of modelling inflation as a function of domestic labour costs, import prices
and measures of demand pressure, implicitly incorporating the view that policy
affects inflation indirectly through its impact on these variables. Although the
specifications adopted in these studies differ in important ways, the results
emphasise a number of common points. First, the inflation process is subject to
considerable inertia, as represented by the adjustment lags built into the estimated
wage-price dynamics. Second, the estimated equations show a strong role for import
prices in overall inflation, substantially bigger than the import share of expenditure
(de Brouwer and Ericsson report a long-run coefficient on import prices of 0.4).
This represents a powerful channel by which monetary policy can influence inflation
via the exchange rate. Third, significant demand effects are captured by output gap
measures, which generally enter with lags of one or two quarters. This is
qualitatively consistent with Lowe’s result, described above, that policy lags are
longer on prices than on activity.
It is possible also to imagine monetary policy having a direct effect on inflation by
influencing expectations. To the extent that the policy framework does influence
inflation expectations directly, it seems sensible to think of this as working through
the numerical objective itself, rather than through any intermediate variable such as
money growth. Hard evidence on the importance of an expectations channel is
difficult to come by, but the apparent inertia in inflation rates and sluggishness of
expectations suggests the effect is not particularly strong. This seems to be15
confirmed by econometric evidence for Australia, New Zealand and Canada which
could not find a role for the effect of policy targeting regimes on expectations
independent of their effect on inflation itself.14
3.4 Summary
The preceding discussion suggests a reasonably clear  qualitative picture of the
working of the policy transmission process. This can be broadly summarised as
operating, in the first instance, via the effect of short-term interest rates on private
expenditure, both directly and through effects on the exchange rate and on credit
supply. Inflation is viewed as being influenced by monetary policy primarily through
effects on the output gap and through the exchange rate. The inflation process
appears to be subject to considerable inertia but, over time, the policy framework
may also play a direct role in shaping inflation expectations. This description leaves
no special role for monetary aggregates except as part of a menu of variables that
might convey information to policy-makers about price and output trends. Plausible
efforts can be made to quantify some, though not all, of the various parts of the
transmission process and to estimate the length of the relevant lags. The areas where
quantification seems to be relatively plausible (though the accuracy should not be
overstated) include the transmission of cash rate changes along the yield curve, the
effects of interest-rate changes on expenditure and the mechanics of the inflation
process. Much greater uncertainty applies in other areas such as the effect of
monetary policy on the exchange rate and the role of expectations in private sector
decisions.
4. General Observations
In a review of the RBA experience with macroeconomic modelling, published in
1980, Jonson and Norton drew a series of lessons, the first of which was, ‘it is hard
to build a good model’. We conclude by outlining a number of reasons why that
observation remains valid, at least as it applies to the problem of quantifying the
effects of monetary policy. There are four points.
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The first point concerns the problem of disentangling cause and effect. Most
monetary policy actions are both causes and consequences of developments in the
wider economy, and empirical separation of the two is unlikely to be
straightforward. At the simplest level, this is the problem that (for example)
interest-rate increases are contractionary but are often correlated with the high
growth and inflation outcomes that induce them. Econometric analysis obviously has
tools to deal with this standard simultaneity problem, but Friedman (1995) argues
that these techniques might not always be very effective in practice. If monetary
policy actions are mainly systematic responses to the broad macroeconomic forces
affecting prices and output, it may be hard to get good instrumental variables for
those actions. Use of lags in econometric equations to overcome this problem will
not necessarily be effective, since monetary policy actions are, by nature,
anticipatory and might reflect non-modelled information about future inflation and
output. Friedman argues that this characteristic can lead to artificially low, or even
incorrectly-signed, estimates of the effects of policy: in particular, if monetary
policy is aimed at only partially offsetting future price and output shocks (as is
optimal under plausible assumptions), policy actions will be correlated with
subsequent price and output movements in the opposite direction to their true causal
impact. Or, if monetary policy were fully successful in stabilising prices and output,
it would appear  ex post to have had no effect because the supposedly affected
variables would not have moved. All this points to the conclusion that, even where
econometrically stable relationships exist, it might nonetheless be hard to get good
estimates of the effects of policy actions. It is also possible that the lengths of
transmission lags are over-estimated.
A second problem concerns the unexplained behaviour of the exchange rate, a key
variable in the policy transmission process. Policy analysis requires estimates or
assumptions concerning all the channels of transmission and results are dependent
on the full set of such assumptions. In this context the exchange rate poses serious
empirical problems. The standard theoretical assumption linking exchange rates to
short-term interest rates is the uncovered interest parity equation. As discussed
earlier, this theoretical relationship is convincingly rejected by the data with a
number of anomalies apparent, including wrong-signed coefficients and, in
Australia, excessive sensitivity of the exchange rate to the terms of trade. Attempts
to rationalise these sorts of results by expanding the framework to incorporate
models of financial risk premia have not been successful. A related strand of
literature, initiated by Meese and Rogoff (1983) emphasises the poor performance17
of macroeconomic models in tracking exchange rates out of sample. These sorts of
results are essentially negative in the sense that they do not show how to obtain an
alternative model of the structural interactions between policy and exchange rates
that is empirically convincing.
Thirdly, there is a set of issues that might be summarised as the problem of
non-mechanical linkages. This refers to a wide range of one-off factors, shifts in
unobservable variables like expectations and business confidence, and ‘long and
variable lags’ of policy transmission, that are not easily amenable to mechanical
modelling. Econometricians might be tempted to classify all such problems as
components of model error terms. But the point is that many of these influences can
be big enough and persistent enough to shape the characteristics of an entire cycle.
Examples include the effects of financial deregulation, the role of the Accord, and
the recent asset-price cycle, or a major structural shift like the transition to low
inflation. Another example is the apparently differing severity of reactions of the
economy to episodes of monetary tightening in the mid and late 1980s. What these
sorts of events illustrate is that good explanation of any medium-term episode is
likely to involve a significant role for factors special to the period, and an
understanding of these factors is needed to complement more mechanistic
approaches to quantifying the role of policy.
Finally, there is the problem of model uncertainty – that is, uncertainty about the
structure and parameters of the economic model. It seems clear that models can give
predictions and policy messages that differ from one another to an economically
significant degree. Because models differ in basic design features like size, data
periodicity and theoretical underpinnings, there is no straightforward criterion for
determining which is ‘the’ correct model or which is, in some overall sense, most
useful for policy analysis. This source of uncertainty is argued to have important
implications for policy.15 In particular, if policymakers are risk averse, model
uncertainty will generally be an argument for reduced ‘activism’ in policy relative to
the certainty case, in the sense of reducing the degree of responsiveness of the
policy instrument to a given shock. Intuitively this is because, when the model is
uncertain, the results of a policy action are more uncertain the bigger the action.
Since any individual model assumes away this source of uncertainty, models are
                                                                                                                                  
15 The argument set out here is elaborated by Blinder (1995).18
likely to overstate the attractiveness of policy activism and the degree of
macroeconomic control that can reasonably be attained.
All of the points raised here are really aspects of inherent uncertainty about how the
economy works. They are not intended as arguments against the use of large scale
econometric models, since these uncertainties apply in one way or another to any
form of policy analysis, but they do argue for modesty about how much accuracy
can be achieved. They also suggest an important role for sensitivity analysis of
model results, and evaluation of policy rules across a range of alternative model
specifications.
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